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Abstract: Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful 
to  the  competitive  environment.  Cartel  participation  is  sanctioned  both  by  national  and  community 
legislation with large fines, which can reach up to 10% of the turnover of the companies involved. In 
order  to  facilitate  the  detection  of  cartels,  which  are,  by  definition,  secret  agreements,  instructions 
promoting  a  leniency  program  were  elaborated  at  European  Commission  level,  encouraging  the 
participants to provide information regarding the existence of a cartel. It is expected that the large fines 
applied in cartel cases will increase the attractiveness of the leniency program and, implicitly, to the 
detection of an even greater number of such practices. 
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Defined as an agreement whereby a group of producers or distributors of the same product set the prices 
or share the market, the cartel is considered to be synonymous to an explicit form of secret agreement, the 
analysis  of  the  economic  effects  of  cartels  being  based  on  the  theory  of  cooperative  oligopoly.  By 
artificially limiting the competition, the undertakings avoid the constraints which generate innovation 
regarding the product development or introduction of some more efficient production methods, leading 
also  to  a  price  increase  for  raw  materials  and  components.  In  the  long  run,  these  anti-competitive 
practices weaken competitiveness and have a negative effect on employment opportunities
1. 
 
Because they are perceived as the most harmful form of anti-competitive manifestation, cartels benefit 
from the greatest attention from the authorities. They are unequivocally harmful to the economy, their 
existence does not bring any benefit neither to the economy nor to the society (the consumer is the one 
that finally supports the consequences), and for these considerations they are seen as serious crimes and 
treated in many countries from the perspective of criminal law. 
 
In some states, cartel-type agreements are treated as illegal regardless of whether their existence affected 
the market or not. This rule apply, for example, in the U.S.A. where all is needed is just a demonstration 
of prosecutors or  victim that there is an understanding that can have anti-competitive effects. In the 
European Union, cartels are regulated by Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, which became Article 81 of 
the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  the  undertakings  found  responsible  for  such 
practices can be fined substantial amount. 
 
One of the most efficient means to counter cartels is represented by leniency policy. A 2002 OECD report 
underlines the efficiency and the generalization of a relatively new tool in countering cartels: “In respect 
to  countering  hardcore  cartels,  the  main  challenge  is  penetrating  beyond  their  secret  wrapper.  To 
encourage a cartel member to confess and involve his plotters with first-rank evidence, from 'inside', 
concerning their communications and clandestine meetings, a competition agency may promise a reduced 
fine, a reduced sentence or even total amnesty
2.” 
 
In most cases, the existence of a cartel can be assumed from analysing undertakings’ behavior in a certain 
market, from analysing price dynamics and trends of the supply and demand evolution, but uncovering 
direct or indirect evidence, doubled by a rigorous economic analysis on the existence and operation of 
cartels, is often a difficult work, thus failures often been found.  
 
                                                
1 Upon Norman, George (ed.), Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2008 
2 The OECD Competition Committee Report (2002);  
In this context, the European Union introduced a leniency program - Leniency Policy - subsequently 
revised  in  2002  in  light  of  gathered  experience,  program  shaped  on  the  basic  ideas  of  the  similar 
transatlantic program. In contrast to the more precautionary Notice of 1996, the Commission notice on 
immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases from 2002
3 brings the attractive, and at the 
same time daring, perspective of automatically granting complete immunity from fine to the first cartel 




The Americans are pioneers in this area, by promoting a leniency program called Corporate Immunity 
Program or Amnesty Program in 1978, program which has been revised in 1993. The approach used by 
antitrust authorities in the United States represents a transposition into practice of the Chicago School 
economic thinking, being one of the successful applications of practical implementation of game theory
5. 
 
This type of approach has proven to lead directly to the secret core of cartels. Consequently, once the 
leniency  program  was  adopted  by  the  European  Commission,  after  1996  European  states  have  also 
adopted national programs, integrating the guidelines of Leniency Policy Notice, as a tool to counter 
cartels. 
 
At the Community level, during 2003-2008 the fines imposed in cartel cases amounted to not less than 
6.81 billion euro (Table 1). 
 
Year  Amount (billions euro) 
2003  0,4 
2004  0,39 
2005  0,68 
2006  1,85 
2007  3,34 
2008  0,15 
Total  6,81 
Table 1. The evolution of fines imposed in cartel cases in the period 2003-2008* 
* The value of fines is not corrected with the decisions of the European Court of Justice and refers only to 
fines for breaching art .81 of the EC Treaty; following the decisions of the European Court of Justice, 
total fines amounted to 6.76 billion euro, due to the change in values for years 2003 and 2004; 
Source: www.europa.eu.int/competition/cartels/statistics. 
 
For the examined cases, the first 10 fines applied to cartels have amounted to not less than 5.37 billion 
euro (78.9% of the total fines), the market structure being shown in Chart 1. 
 
The main sectors at European level which have been confronted with cartels, as a form of restrictive 
competition  are:  chemistry,  building  materials  and  some  equipment  and  installations  for  elevation
6. 
Regarding the undertakings, the first 10 fines amounted 2.57 billion euro, their situation being published 
in Table no 2. 
 
  Amount of fines - euro 
ThyssenKrupp  479669850 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG  462000000 
Siemens AG  39662500 
EniSpA  272250000 
Lafarge SA  249600000 
                                                
3 European Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (2002/C45/03). 
4 See also: Wils, Wouter, Efficiency and justice in European antitrust enforcement, Oxford: Hart, 2008 
5 Kovacic, E. William; Saphiro, Carl, Antitrust Policy. A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter 2000 
6 According to: Jones, Alison; Brenda, Sufrin, EC competition law: texts, cases, and materials, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008  
  Amount of fines - euro 
BASF AG  236845000 
Otis  224932950 
Heineken NV  219275000 
Arkema SA  219131250 
Solvay SA/NV  167062000 
Total  2 570 428 550 
Table no 2. The amount of the first 10 fines on undertakings during 2001-2007 




Graph no. 1. The structure of the value of the first 10 fines applied by the European Commission 
for cartel cases, on the markets investigated during 2001-2007 (%) 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of statistical data available at 
www.europa.eu.int/competition/cartels/statistics. 
 
The largest fines have been applied to some important companies active on the European market, namely: 
Thyssen Krupp F. Hoffman_La Roche AG, Eni SpA, Lafarge SA, BASF AG, Otis; Heineken NV ss 
Arkema SA. 
 
The work of the European Commission in the field of cartels materialized in the identification of the 78 
cartels since 1990 and so far, of which 73% were discovered in the period 2000-2008 (Table no.3). 
 
Period  Number of cartels  % total 
1990-1994  11  14,1 
1995-1999  10  12,8 
2000-2004  33  42,3 
2005-2008  24  30,8 
Total  78  100 
Table no. 3. The number of cartels identified by the European Commission during 1990-2008 
Source: www.europa.eu.int/competition/cartels/statistics. 
 
Modeling continuous the policy of leniency in connection with other guidelines combating cartels still 
remains  a  topic  opened  to  permanent  changes  and  revisions,  induced  by  the  need  to  prevent  the 
manifestation  of  any  potential  anti-competitive  practices,  on  a  market  with  more  and  more  evident 










Elevators and escalators  Vitamins 
Gas insulated switchgear  Synthetic rubber
Flat glass  Plasterboard 
Hydrogen peroxide and perborate  Methacrylates
Hard haberdashery: fasteners  Fittings  
 
Promoting leniency policy and severely sanctioning cartels must become an essential objective in the 
activity  of  any  competition  authority,  in  order  to  induce  positive  effects  in  maintaining  a  normal 
competitive environment and to guarantee a proper functioning of the market economy. 
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